To DRINK OR NOT TO DRINK: THE SUPREME COURT
DELIVERS A SOBERING BLOW TO THE INTOXICATION
DEFENSE BY PLACING DUE PROCESS ON THE ROCKS
The Due Process Clause' of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires the government to prove beyond
I U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses both procedural safeguards and substantive due process rights. See LAuRENcE H. TRinE,
AMERICAN CoNsrrTToNNA LAw § 10-7, at 664 n.4 (2d ed. 1988). The procedural
component of the Due Process Clause guarantees an individual the "right to be
heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind." Id. at 664
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter,J., concurring)).
Substantive due process, on the other hand, is concerned with the actual content of laws rather than the procedures by which those laws are enforced. See TRIBE,
supra,§ 10-7, at 664 n.4. This concept was first applied to assail state legislation that
infringed upon the freedom of an individual to enter into a contract. See Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that a state law that sets a maximum
limit on the number of hours bakery employees can work unconstitutionally encroaches upon the freedom to contract). Substantive due process has been utilized
to protect a plethora of fundamental rights, especially the right to privacy. SM, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (declaring that the right to privacy includes
the right to obtain an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (recognizing a right to privacy in using contraception).
In the criminal law arena, the Due Process Clause has long been held to protect the interest of a criminal defendant in a fair trial. See TRiBE, supra, § 10-8, at
683; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (declaring that the right
to a fair trial is "fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice"). In this regard,
due process is denied if an individual is deprived of liberty "'on a record lacking any
relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged.'" Vachon v. New
Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 480 (1974) (citations omitted). Procedural due process
principles mandate that the government may not imprison or otherwise physically
restrain a person except in accordance with fair procedures. SeeJoHN E. NOWAK &
RoNALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsrrrONAL LAw § 13.2, at 511 (5th ed. 1995). One such
procedure protects the right of an accused in a criminal trial to present witnesses
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a reasonable doubt every element of the crime with which a defendant is charged.2 It is a well-established principle of American criminal law that the government must prove not only that a defendant
committed certain acts, but also that the defendant possessed a certain mental state at the time such acts were committed.- Crimes that
bear the label "specific intent"4 require a state of mind, or mens rea,
and offer evidence supportive of his claims. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
285, 294 (1973). The Supreme Court has also held that the Due Process Clause
guarantees to a defendant a presumption of innocence. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 13.4, at 520 n.9. Traditionally, this presumption required that an instruction
be given to the jury. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978). Taylor, however, was later reinterpreted by the Supreme Court. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979). In Whorton, the Court held that the failure to instruct a
jury on the presumption of innocence is not a per se violation of due process standards but only one of the factors to be considered in such an analysis. See id.
2 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The requirement that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime for which a
defendant is charged is known as the reasonable doubt standard. See NowAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 13.4, at 519 n.2. The standard also prohibits the use of
any device that would have the effect of shifting to the accused the burden of disproving any basic element of the criminal charge. See id. at 520. The reasonable
doubt standard was granted constitutional status in Winship. See 397 U.S. at 364.
The Winship Court enunciated three interests that the reasonable doubt standard
protects. See id. at 363. First, the Court observed, it protects the defendant's interest in being free from an arbitrarily imposed loss of liberty. See id. Second, the
Court maintained, it protects the defendant from the stigmatization that results
from a conviction. See id. at 563-64. Third, the Court declared, it gives concrete
substance to the presumption of innocence. See id. at 364. In this regard, the Court
stated that "[ilt is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned." Id. at 364. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the
reasonable doubt standard is "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free." Id. at 372 (Harlan,J., concurring).
3 SeeJOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMrNAL LAw 196 (3d ed. 1996). Since the seventeenth century, common-law crimes have required the presence of mens rea in addition to the commission of the acts. SeeJ.W.C. Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes
at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 31, 35 (1936); see also BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY 985
(6th ed. 1990) (defining mens rea as "a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose, a
criminal intent."). It must be noted, however, that to obtain a conviction for a strict
liability crime there is no requirement that a defendant possess a certain mental
state. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusnN W. SCOTT, JR., SuBsTrANTcvE CitmINAL LAW §
3.8, at 340 (1986). Strict liability crimes usually do not result in the imposition of a
serious penalty, such as a prison sentence. See id. at 340-41. Strict liability crimes
are defined as "[u]nlawful acts whose elements do not contain the need for criminal intent or mens rea." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990). In general,
strict liability crimes are "acts that endanger the public welfare, such as illegal
dumping of toxic wastes." Id.
4 See BLACK's LAw DIcIoNARY 810 (6th ed. 1990). Specific intent is generally
defined as "the intent to accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits." Id.
General intent is defined as "the intent to do that which the law prohibits." Id. In
general intent crimes, "[ilt is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the
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of purposeful or knowing behavior.6 In an attempt to negate the
mens rea requirements of purposefully or knowingly, it has been argued that evidence of an actor's voluntary intoxication,7 so far as it
may prevent the formation of the requisite mental state, should be
admissible in evidence. 8 Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court held that state statutes that prohibit ajury from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining the existence of a mental state do not violate the Due Process Clause
Traditionally, evidence of a person's intoxication was not admissible as a defense to a crime. Moreover, for many years, such evidefendant intended the precise harm or the precise result which eventuated." Id.
5 See id. at 985. Mens rea is defined as "a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful
purpose, a criminal intent." Id. The presence of a mens rea is a necessary element in
most crimes. See Turner, supranote 3, at 85.
6 See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 235. The Model Penal Code has
essentially
done away with the term "specific intent" and in its stead adopted the terms
.purposely" and "knowingly." See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2) (a) (i), (b) (i)
(1985) (defining "purposely" as an actor's conscious object and "knowingly" as an
actor's awareness). Throughout this Note, however, the terms "general intent" and
"specific intent" continue to be discussed in historical context. See supra note 4
(defining general intent and specific intent).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5) (a) (1985). The code defines intoxication as
"a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of
substances into the body." Id. It must be noted that "intoxication" can be achieved
through use of narcotics as well as alcohol. See, e.g., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203
(1995) (ascribing the same legal consequences to both alcohol use and narcotics
use).
Voluntary intoxication is defined as "[tihe voluntary introduction of any substances into the body which the defendant knows or should know are likely to have
an intoxicating effect." BLACK'S LAw DicTzoNAa" 822 (6th ed. 1990). The Model
Penal Code refers to voluntary intoxication as "self-induced intoxication," which it
defines as
intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he
knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to
medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense
to a charge of crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (5) (b) (1985).
a See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 4.10, at 552. The exception to the criminal law, however, was "slow to take root." SeeJerome Hall, Intoxication and Ciinnal
Responsibility, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 1045, 1049 (1944); see also 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAw DEFEN SES § 65(a) (2), at 288-94 (1984) (delineating the history and
current applicability of the intoxication defense); Comment, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1210, 1212 (1981) (discussing the development of
the intoxication defense).
SSee Montanav. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2024 (1996).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 657-58 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820)
(No. 14,868) (declaring that intoxication neither excuses nor mitigates homicide);
Reniger v. Fogossa, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1551) (espousing the view that voluntary
intoxication neither excuses nor mitigates criminal culpability).
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dence was sometimes considered an aggravating factor in sentencing." The modem shift, however, has been to permit evidence of
voluntary intoxication in determining criminal liability. 2 In states
recognizing the admissibility of such evidence as a defense, defendants could argue that their self-induced intoxication precluded
them from forming the mens rea necessary to convict them of the
crime in question." In recent years, however, several states have responded by enacting statutes that prevent criminal defendants from
introducing evidence of their self-induced intoxication. 4
In the recent case of Montana v. Egelhoff, " the Supreme Court
held that a state statute preventing juries from considering evidence
of voluntary intoxication when determining whether a defendant
possessed a requisite mental state to commit deliberate murder does6
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Specifically, the Court held that the right to have ajury consider evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining whether the accused
possessed the requisite intent is not a fundamental principle of justice.' Therefore, the Court declared, Montana's statutory ban on
consideration of such evidence did not violate the Due Process
Clause.' The Court predicated its holding on the authority of states

1 See Cornel! F. Cas. at 657-58 (describing that historically "far from its being in
law an excuse for murder, [intoxication] is rather an aggravation of its malignity")

(citing 4 WILIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

866 (4th ed. 1938)).

See Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1882) (recognizing that voluntary intoxication may be considered by a jury determining the degree of crime); Reg. v.
Doherty (1887), reprinted in 16 Cox's RaP. oF CASES IN CriM. L. 806, 308 (1890)
(declaring that drunkenness may be considered in determining whether the defendant formed the intent necessary for the commission of the crime); see also R.W.
Gascoyne, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to a CriminalCharge,8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1246 (1966) (discussing the modem shift
toward the allowance of voluntary intoxication in determining criminal culpability).
1
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 4.10, at 552.
SSee Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2020 n.2. In addition to Montana, nine states have
enacted statutes that prevent criminal defendants from introducing evidence of
their intoxication to argue that they did not possess the requisite scienter. See ARiz.
REv. STAT. § 13-503 (1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-207 (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4 (1992); HAw. REv. STAT. § 702230(2) (1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.076(3) (1994); TEx. PENAL. CODE ANN. § 8.04
(West 1994); Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d 473, 478-79 (Miss. 1988); State v. Vaughn,
12

232 S.E.2d 328, 330-31 (S.C. 1977).
15 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
1" See id. at 2024.

11 See id. at 2019. The Court opined that the primary guide in determining a
fundamental principle ofjustice is historical custom. See id. at 2017.
is See id. at 2024.

518

SETON HALL LA WREWVEW

[Vol. 28:514

to adopt their own evidentiary rules. 19 The Court further proclaimed
that long-standing views toward voluntary intoxication should be allowed to prevail in Montana."
In July 1992, James Allen Egelhoff met Roberta Pavola and John
Christenson while camping in the Yaak region of northwestern Montana.21 The three became friends and spent much of the day drinking at bars and at a private party." Some time after 9:00 P.M., the
three left the private party in Christenson's station wagon. 2 At about
midnight on July 13, sheriff's officers from Lincoln County responded to reports of a drunk driver and discovered the station
wagon stuck in a ditch along United States Highway Two.24 Upon arriving at the scene, the officers discovered the bodies of Pavola and
Christenson in the front seat of the car. 2" Both Payola and Christenson had single gunshot wounds to the head." In the rear of the car,
Egelhoff was yelling obscenities; his .38 caliber gun was found on the
floor of the car near the brake pedal with four loaded rounds and
two empty shell casings." Egelhoff also had gunpowder residue on
his hands. 8 Over an hour after being taken to the hospital, Egelhoff's blood alcohol concentration was .36 percent."
Egelhoff was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide, a
crime defined in Montana as "purposely or knowingly caus[ing] the
death of another human being."30 At trial, Egelhoff claimed that he
19 See id. at 2017.
20 See id. at 2024. The plurality noted that the people of Montana had merely
"decided to resurrect the rule of an earlier era." Id.
21 SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016.
22

Seeid.

23

See id. Sometime after the three left the party, Egelhoff was seen purchasing

beer. See id.

24 Seid.
25

See id.

See id. Officers' who took Egelhoff to a local hospital testified at trial that he
was "intoxicated, combative and cursing profusely." State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260,
262 (Mont 1995). Egelhoff continued to act wildly for five to six hours. See id.
SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016.
28
26

See id.

Seeid.
so Id. (citing MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1) (a) (1995)). Under Montana
law,
"[a] person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if he "purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being...." MoNr. CODE ANN. § 45-5102(1) (a). The Montana Code defines "knowingly" and "purposely" as follows:
29

"Knowingly"-a person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a

circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware of the person's own conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct de-

scribed by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware that
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had no recollection of what had occurred and that, therefore, an
unidentified fourth person must have committed the murders."' He
also alleged that his own extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing the murders.32
At the conclusion of the trial, the prosecution offered a jury instruction from section 45-2-203 of the Montana Code, which states
that voluntary intoxication "is not a defense.., and may not be
taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental
state which is an element of the offense."3 The trial counsel for the
defendant objected to the instruction, arguing that it would shift the
burden of proof to the defendant with respect to the mens rea com-

it is highly probable that the result will be caused by the person's conduct. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence.
"Purposely"-a person acts purposely with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is the person's
conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.
When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is
established although the purpose is conditional, unless the condition
negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining
the offense.
Id. § 45-2-101 (34), (63).
31 See Eglhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016. Egelhoff may have been
alluding to the traveling companion with whom he parted company shortly before he met Payola and
Christenson. Se Egeihoff,900 P.2d at 261.
32 See ,geloff, 116 S. Ct. at 2016. Indeed, a doctor who treated Egelhoff at the
hospital on the night of the incident testified that Egelhoff likely experienced an
alcohol-induced "blackout" that prevented him from recalling the events of that
night. See Egeihoff, 900 P.2d at 263. This argument, however, was contradicted by
the testimony of a police officer who stated that Egelhoff possessed enough coordination to be able to kick a camera out of the officer's hands. See id. at 262.
S MON.T. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203. The complete text of this statute reads as follows:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible
for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any
offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless
the defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating
substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise
ingested the substance causing the condition.
Id.
Montana had allowed evidence of voluntary intoxication to be considered in
determining a defendant's mental state until 1987 when the section of the statute
dealing with criminal responsibility was amended specifically to exclude it. See id. §
45-2-203 (1985) (amended 1987) (stating that "[a]n intoxicated or drugged condition may be taken into consideration in determination of the existence of a mental
state which is an element of the offense.").
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ponent of the crime.' The trial judge, however, overruled the objection of defense counsel and instructed the jury, pursuant to section
45-2-203, that a person who is intoxicated is still criminally responsible for his conduct, and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to
any crime, including murder" The jury convicted Egelhoff of the
deliberate murders' of Pavola and Christenson, and he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of forty-two years of imprisonment."7
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Egelhoff argued
that the statute upon which the jury instruction was based"6 deprived
him of due process because it relieved the state of its burden to
prove the required mental state for deliberate homicide.3 9 The state,
however, argued that Egelhoff was not prejudiced because he was allowed to use evidence of his intoxication to suggest that he lacked
the physical ability to commit the murders.4 The Montana Supreme
Court, agreeing with the defendant, reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.4 ' The court held unanimously that the
state's burden of proof on the issue of Egelhoffs mental state had
been unconstitutionally reduced because the jury was not allowed to
consider evidence of voluntary intoxication.42 The court explained
that it is the obligation of the state to prove beyond a reasonable

See Egehoff,900 P.2d at 263.
See id. The instruction read as follows:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible
for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any
offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless
the Defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating
substance when he consumed the substance causing the condition.
Id.

See id. Deliberate murder is analogous to first-degree murder in that both
require that a defendant either purposely or knowingly caused the death of another
person. See id.
37
See id. at 261.
38 See supra notes 33 (delineating the text of the statute) and 35 (stating
the
challenged jury instruction).
39 SeeEgelhoff, 900 P.2d at
263.
40 See id. at 264. Under Montana law, a defendant can introduce
evidence of his
intoxication to question his ability to have committed the actus reus, but may not
introduce such evidence to disprove that he possessed the mens rea. See id.
4
See id. at 261. The Montana Supreme Court held that under the Due Process
Clause, Egelhoff had a right to present and have a jury consider "all relevant evidence" to rebut the state's argument that he had committed each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 266.
42

See id. at 266.
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doubt each element of the crime charged and that this burden was
unconstitutionally lessened by the jury instruction."3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari." Justice
Scalia, writing for a plurality, declared that states have broad discretion to adopt their own evidentiary rules so long as they do not offend some fundamental "principle ofjustice" that is deeply rooted in
tradition.05 The plurality contended that the allowance in some jurisdictions of voluntary intoxication evidence to negate the mens rea
is too recent a development to have garnered constitutional protection." The plurality also acknowledged that, although defendants
have a due process right to defend themselves, states may limit the
introduction
of otherwise relevant evidence when there is a valid rea47
son. The Court explained that criminal defendants do not have a
right to introduce all relevant evidence because evidence that is privileged or incompetent is clearly excludable."'
It was well established at common law that a defendant's voluntary intoxication was neither an excuse nor a justification for his
crimes.49 Reniger v. Fogossa" is the first reported case discussing the
See id. at 268 (Nelson,J., concurring). The concurrence emphasized that
the
court's holding should not be viewed as an approval of the affirmative defense of
voluntary intoxication. See id. at 267 (Nelson, J., concurring). The justice argued
that the case was not about the intoxication defense, but rather about the burden of
proof and "the fundamental obligation of the State to prove each element of a
criminal charge-including the mental state element-beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 267-68 (Nelson,J., concurring).
44 See116S. Ct. 598 (1995).
4 See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2017 (1996). The Court
was able to
overrule the Montana Supreme Court on a question of state law because the state
supreme court had based its decision on the United States Constitution. See Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 264.
46 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021. The Court asserted
that the ability ofjuries to
consider evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication "is of too recent vintage,
and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent allegiance to qualify as
fundamental, especially since it displaces a lengthy common-law tradition which
remains supported by validjustifications today." Id.
47 See id. at 2017. One example of such a valid reason, according
to the Court, is
when a state limits evidence of intoxication out of respect for the proposition that
"one who has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the
consequences." Id. at 2020.
See id. at 2017; see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (declaring
that the accused may not offer evidence that is privileged, incompetent, or otherwise inadmissible).
4 See R.U. Singh, History of the Defense of Drunkenness in English Criminal
Law, 49
LAW Q. REv. 528, 530 (1933) (delineating the traditional rule concerning drunkenness). Early legal commentators suggested that the disability of intoxication was too
easy to feign. See Hall, supra note 8, at 1047. It is important to note that with the
technological development of devices that can test for intoxicants, such a fear has
43
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common-law belief that an intoxicated person should be treated by
the courts as if he were sober.5' The Reniger court reasoned that a defendant should not benefit from self-induced intoxication. 52
During the nineteenth century, intoxication began to be recognized as a factor used to disprove the required mens rea.' In Hopt v.
Peop/e,' the United States Supreme Court recognized that a shift had
occurred in the relevance of intoxication in a criminal trial.!, The
Hopt case noted that although voluntary drunkenness could not be a
complete excuse, it could be considered in determining premeditation.'
The most famous delineation of the intoxication defense came
in the 1920 English case of Director of Public Prosecution v. Beards
Writing for the court, Lord Birkenhead held that where specific intent is an element of the offense, the jury may take into considerabecome almost groundless. See, e.g., Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 82, 474
A.2d 1, 10 (1984) (holding that "the results of a Breathalyzer test shall be generally
admissible in evidence" in New Jersey). Others have expressed concern over the
harm society would encounter if drunks could avoid responsibility for their conduct. See 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, CaImiNAL LAW § 66, at 95 (1932). One legal commentator even observed, "There could be rarely a conviction for homicide if drunkenness avoided responsibility." Id.
w 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (KB. 1551).
51 See id. at 31.
52 See id. The court held:
If a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be [a] Felony, and he
shall be hanged for it, and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he
was drunk he had no understandingnor memory; but inasmuch as that
ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have
avoided it, he shall not be priviledged [sic] thereby.
Id. (emphasis added). This view of intoxication is similar to traditional views toward the effect of voluntary intoxication on crimes that are considered to have a
"general intent." See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 8, § 4.10, at 554. That is, in these
types of crimes the negligence or recklessness one exhibits in becoming intoxicated
is imputed to supply the requisite mental state of negligence or recklessness. See id.
at 556.
See HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETrE HASSE, MErTAL DisAmmEs AND
CpImiNAL REsPONSIBILr 79 (1979). The recognition of voluntary intoxication as a
factor that may disprove mens rea occurred as the view that equated moral delinquency (such as intoxication) with criminal liability fell out of favor. See Gascoyne,
supra note 12, at 1246; Singh, supranote 49, at 537.
104 U.S. 631 (1882).
See id. at 634.
See id. It is important to note that even jurisdictions that allow a defendant to
challenge his mental state with evidence of intoxication will only permit a jury to
find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder. See IAFAv & ScoTt, supra note
3, § 4.10, at 555. In some circumstances, defendants may be found guilty of manslaughter, but will almost certainly not be acquitted. See id.
1920 App. Cas. 479 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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tion evidence of a defendant's drunkenness that may render the accused incapable of forming such intent." Thus, the admissibility of
evidence of a defendant's voluntary inebriation became predicated
on whether the crime was one of "specific intent" or "general intent."59 Specific intent is defined as a specified criminal intent beyond the act done, while general intent only applies to the act itself.60
One of the negative consequences of precluding a jury from
considering intoxication evidence is that the exclusion of such evidence may unconstitutionally lessen the burden of the state to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.6 In the seminal case of In re Winship,62 the Supreme Court enunciated the principle that the Due
Process Clause requires the state to prove every element of a criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." In Winship, the State of New
York charged twelve-year-old Samuel Winship with stealing $112
from a woman's pocketbook.64 The juvenile court judge declared
that Winship could be adjudicated a delinquent by a preponderance
of the evidence."' The Supreme Court reversed and held that the
Due Process Clause requires that each element of a criminal offense
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.66
See id. at 499. Voluntary intoxication at common law, far from exonerating
the defendant, often only mitigated his "crime" such that murder would be reduced
to manslaughter. See id. at 500.
59

See Reg. v. Monkhouse (1849), reprinted in 4 Cox's

REP. OF CASES IN

CRIM. L.

55, 56 (1851) (enunciating the first appearance of the phrase "specific intention").
60 See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 447 (1947);
see also
FINGARETrE & FINGARETrE HASSE, supra note 53, at 95 (contrasting "specific intent"
crimes with "general intent" crimes). Again, the phrases "specific intent" and
"general intent" are no longer used in describing culpable mental states. See supra
note 6 (discussing the abandonment of the terms "specific intent" and "general intent"). The Model Penal Code refers to "specific intent" crimes as those that re-

quire mental states of "knowingly" or "purposely." See

MODEL

PENAL CODE § 2.02

(1985) (defining "purposely" and "knowingly").
61 See State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 266 (Mont.
1995).
6 97 U.S. 358 (1970).
63 See id. at 364. Related to this requirement of proof is
the presumption of innocence, a presumption that has been recognized as resting at the "foundation of
the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895).
64 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 359-60.

See id. The preponderance standard was based on section 744(b) of the New
York Family Court Act. See 1962 N.Y. Laws § 744(b).
See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. In so holding the Court determined that
[t]he accused... has at stake interests of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction
and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom
of every individual should not condemn a man for a commission of a
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Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur,e7 the Court interpreted
Winship to mean that a state cannot shift to the defendant the bur-

den of proof on a required element." The Mullaney defendant, who
was convicted of murder, claimed that he had attacked the victim in
the heat of passion.69 The Court addressed the constitutionality of a
jury instruction that stipulated that malice aforethought was to be
presumed and required that the defendant be convicted of murder

instead of manslaughter if the state established beyond a reasonable
doubt that a homicide was both intentional and unlawful. 70 Thus,
the jury instruction required the defendant to rebut the presumption that he possessed malice aforethought. 7' The Court held that
the Due Process Clause requires the state, not the defendant, to
prove the absence of heat of passion 72 or sudden provocation when
such conditions are elements of the crime charged.
crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt....
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
Id. at 363-64. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan posited that the reasonable
doubt requirement is "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."
Id. at 372 (Harlan,J., concurring).
The Model Penal Code states that "[n]o person may be convicted of an offense
unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1985). The Code continues, "In the absence of such proof,
the innocence of a defendant is assumed." Id.
67

421 U.S. 684 (1975).

" See id. at 704.
69 See id. at 685. Wilbur argued that the victim's homosexual advances
toward
him provoked the attack. See id. The applicable Maine murder statute provided:
"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express
or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life."
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (West 1964) (repealed 1975).
70 See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686. The applicable manslaughter statute
stated in
relevant part: "Whoever unlawfully kills another human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought... shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $1000 or by imprisonment for not more than
20 years...." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2551 (emphasis added). The trial court,
in its instruction to the jury, defined malice aforethought as requiring a
"premeditated design to kill" and a manifestation of a "general malignancy and disregard for human life which proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fatally
bent on mischief." Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 n.4 (citation omitted).
71 See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 687. Wilbur claimed that
he acted in the heat of passion, upon provocation, and thus without the malice aforethought required for a
murder conviction. See id. at 685.
72 See id. at 687 n.4. The trial court gave the following instruction
to the jury de-
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In Pattersonv. New York,74 however, the Supreme Court held that
due process principles are not violated when the defendant has the

burden of proving an affirmative defense that is not an element of a
crime. 75 In Patterson, the defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder after the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he
had caused the death of another and had intended the death to occur.76 Patterson could have reduced the conviction to manslaughter
if he had proven that he had "acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance."" Patterson challenged his conviction on
due process grounds, claiming that the state's burden of proof had
been shifted to him.78 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
maintaining that Patterson was not required to disprove an element
of the offense with which he was charged; therefore, there was no
due process violation."' The Court reasoned that, unlike the statute

fining heat of passion:
"Heat of passion... means that at the time of the act the reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might [make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irrationally without
due deliberation or reflection, and from passion rather than judgment."
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
73 See id. at 704.
'4 432 U.S. 197
(1977).
5 See id. at 205-06.
In so holding, the Patterson Court noted that states have
great freedom to define their criminal laws in any way they desire. See id. at 201.
The Court reasoned that a due process analysis of a given state crime will depend
on how the state chooses to define the elements of that offense. See id. at 211 n.12.
In determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is dispositive. See id.
76 See id. at 198 (quoting N.Y. PENALLAw§ 125.27
(McKinney 1975)).
77 Id. In New York, as opposed to Maine, the murder statute expressly
stipulated
that a defendant who acted "'under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse'" has an affirmative defense.
Id. at 198 n.2 (citation omitted).
78 See id. at 201. Patterson is also notable for the proposition
that the states' substantive criminal laws rarely offend "'some principal ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. at 202
(citations omitted).
This viewpoint was supported in Martin v. Ohio, where the Court held that a
state may place on the defendant the burden of proving an affirmative defense of
self-defense. See 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987). The dictum in Martin made clear, however, that the decision would have been different had the jury been instructed not
to consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether Martin was guilty of
the crime. See id. at 233-34.
19 See Patterson,432 U.S. at 216.
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at issue in Mullaney,8" the New York statute did not include the element of "malice aforethought" in its definition of murder."
Two terms after Patterson, the Court decided Sandstrom v. Montana,' wherein the Court declared unconstitutional ajury instruction
that a person is presumed to intend the consequences of his voluntary acts." In Sandstrom, defendant David Sandstrom was charged
with "purposely" or "knowingly" causing the death of another."
Sandstrom argued that although he did commit the murder, he did
not have the purpose or intent to do so." The trial court instructed
the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts."" Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, reversed Sandstrom's conviction." TheJustice declared
that the instruction violated the Due Process Clause in that it effectively negated psychiatric evidence that may have demonstrated that
the defendant did not "intend" the consequences of his voluntary
act.a
The Court in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,' however, once again affirmed the authority of states to define their substantive criminal
laws and procedures without offending due process principles.9 In
McMillan, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania law that stipulated that
proof of possession of a firearm need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and may be treated as a sentencing consideration
within the discretion of the trial court." In so holding, the Court reso See supra note 70 (discussing the language of the Maine statute).
81 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214-16 (distinguishing the holding in Mullaney).
8
442 U.S. 510 (1979).
83

See id. at 524.

See id. at 512; see also supra note 30 (delineating Montana's definition of deliberate homicide). Sandstrom killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman in a brutal attack
that involved sexual assault. See State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106, 107 (Mont.

1979).

See Sandstrom, 580 P.2d at 107. Sandstrom claimed that he only intended to
"silence" the woman. See id. at 108.
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 513. The defendant objected that the instruction had
the effect (1) of creating a mandatory presumption of guilt and, furthermore, (2) of
impermissibly shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving the mental state
of "purposely" or "knowingly." See id. In support of the objection, the defense
counsel offered the decisions of Mullaney and Patterson. See id. In denying defendant's objection to the jury instruction, the trial judge told the defense counsel:
"You can give those to the Supreme Court." Id.
8
Seeid. at 521.
See id.
90

477 U.S. 79 (1986).
Seeid. at91.

9'

Seeid.
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affirmed the principle that the definitions of substantive criminal
laws are within the province of the states.9 The Court held that the
Due Process Clause does not bar states from enacting changes in
their criminal laws that have the effect of making it easier for the
9
prosecution to obtain convictions.
The reasoning in McMillan was supported in Martin v. Ohio,"
where the Court held that a state may place upon the defendant the
burden of proving the affirmative defense of self-defense. 9 The dictum in Martin, however, made it clear that the Court's decision
would have been different had the jury been instructed not to consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether Martin was
guilty of the crime.' Such an instruction, the Court indicated, would
"run afoul of Winship's mandate. " 7
The recent case of Montana v. Egelhoff8 reflects the growing opposition by several states to the admission of evidence of voluntary
intoxication to negate a guilty state of mind." In Egelhoff, the Court
held that a state statute preventing the fact-finder from considering
whether a defendant's voluntary intoxication negated the formation
of the requisite mental state did not violate the Due Process
Clause.'0 Writing for the plurality in a five to four decision,'' Justice
Scalia began by challenging the holding of the Montana Supreme
See id. at 85 (citing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)).
3 See id. at 89 n.5. The Court observed that "[fMrom the vantage point of the
Constitution, a change in law favorable to defendants is not necessarily good, nor is
an innovation favorable to the prosecution necessarily bad." Id. (quoting Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and the Burden of Proof in the
CriminalLaw,88 YALEL.J. 1325, 1361 (1979)).

480 U.S. 228 (1987).

5 Seeid. at 236.
See id. at 233-34. States must define their criminal laws within the confines
of
due process limits. See generaUy Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. CL 1373 (1996). In
Cooper, the Supreme Court held that a state law presuming a defendant to be competent to stand trial unless he proves incompetence by clear and convincing evidence violated the Due Process Clause. See id. at 1377.
0 Martin, 480 U.S. at 234.
116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
See id. at 2019-20.
100See id. at 2024.
101See id. at 2016, 2024, 2026, 2032, 2034. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in the plurality opinion. See id. at
2016. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. See id. at 2024
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer. See id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
authored a separate dissent. See id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stevens. See id. at 2034 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Court"' and asserting that the Due Process Clause has not been interpreted to give a defendant the right to have all relevant evidence
introduced at trial." 3
Justice Scalia's continued the analysis by noting that state criminal laws are the proper province of the states.' °4 The Justice next
opined that an evidentiary rule in the criminal law is unlikely to trigger due process protection unless "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."' 05 The plurality then enunciated that to
prevail, Egelhoff must establish that the right to have ajury consider

evidence of his voluntary intoxication is a fundamental principle of
justice."°6
Justice Scalia next embarked on an examination of historical
practice to determine how voluntary intoxication was viewed in the
eyes of the common law.'0 7 The Justice stated that, beginning with
the laws of England, the common law did not grant an exculpatory
value to evidence of voluntary intoxication!" The plurality then in102 See id. at 2016-17 (citing State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 266 (Mont. 1995)).

The Montana Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have all relevant evidence consideredbythejury. See id.
103 See id. at 2017; see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (holding
that "[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."). Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Montana Rules of Evidence
provide:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or miskading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 403; MoNr. CODE ANN. § 26-10-Rule 404 (1997) (emphasis added).
104See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2023-24 (stating that the development of criminal
laws "has always been thought to be the province of the [s] tates.") (citing Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968)).
105 Id. at 2017 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)); see
also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (asserting that "the Due
Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review
of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules").
106 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017. Justice Scalia implied that Egelhoff would have
to pass the test established in Patterson. See id.; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text (setting forth the test established in Pattersonfor determining whether a
state's criminal law offends Due Process Clause principles).
07 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017-18.
08 See id. at 2018. According to the English legalist Hale, the intoxicated defendant "shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have
the same judgment as if he were in his right senses." 1 MATrHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32-33 (First American ed. 1847).
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ferred that the same laws that prevented the use of voluntary intoxication as an excuse to a crime also prevented a defendant from introducing this defense to challenge the existence of a culpable mens
109
rea.
Justice Scalia acknowledged that throughout the nineteenth
century, courts did recognize an exception to the common law's
complete condemnation of drunkenness."' The Court expounded
that the exception permitted a jury to consider a defendant's intoxication when deciding whether he possessed the mental state needed
to commit the charged crime when the crime was one of "specific intent.""' The plurality contended, however, that the burden was on
Egelhoff to prove that Montana's statute violated a deeply rooted
principle ofjustice"' and that this burden had not been overcome."
Far from negating a state of mind, evidence of one's voluntary intoxication was
often viewed by the law as an aggravation of the offense. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at
2018. Indeed, in one of the first American cases dealing with this issue,Judge Story
opined that "[drunkenness is a gross vice, and in the contemplation of some of our
laws is a crime .... [Flar from its being an excuse for murder[,] it is rather an aggravation of its malignity." United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 657-58
(C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868).
109 See Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2018. The Court averred that the early legal commentators were familiar with the concept of mens rea and could have recognized
that evidence of voluntary intoxication should be considered if they had so desired.
See id.
n1 See id. at 2018-19; see also Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1882)
(recognizing that voluntary intoxication may be considered by ajury in determining
the presence of premeditation or deliberation); People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344
(1872) (allowing ajury only to consider evidence of voluntary intoxication as it affects the degree of the crime); Pigman v. Ohio, 14 Ohio 555, 556-57 (1846)
(holding that voluntary intoxication may be considered in determining a defendant's mental state).
I See id. Society's then-new belief that alcoholism was a disease to be treated
and not a vice to be punished probably effectuated this change in the common law.
See HALL, supra note 60, at 445. One of the first cases to allude to this change was
the English case of Reg. v. Doherty,in which the court recognized:
[Blut, although you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime,
yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing
it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the fact that a
man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention
necessary to constitute the crime.
Reg. v. Doherty (1887), reprinted in 16 Cox's RP. OF CASES IN CRIM. L. 306, 308
(1890). Although there were still cases to the contrary, by the end of the nineteenth century this new view prevailed and the United States Supreme Court eventually upheld it. See generally Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631 (1882).
Evidence of voluntary intoxication, however, has generally not been a defense
to "general intent" crimes, which require a mens rea of reckless or negligent behavior. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 3, § 4.10, at 554. This was because becoming
intoxicated was itself viewed as a negligent or reckless act. See id.
112 SeeEgeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2019 (citing Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S. 197, 202
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The Court next considered the policy justifications for Montana's law and observed that as many as half of all homicides are
committed by intoxicated offenders.11 4 The Court stated that disallowing evidence of voluntary intoxication helps to deter those who
may become drunk and commit crimes, and punishes those who are
incapable of controlling their violent inclinations while drunk."'
The plurality concluded this part of the Court's analysis by declaring
that the practice of allowing voluntary intoxication to negate the
mens rea is not a fundamental right meriting due process protection.n1
Justice Scalia also explained that the Monana Supreme Court
had incorrectly interpreted Chambers v. Mississippi. as standing for
the proposition that a criminal defendant has the right to introduce
all relevant evidence." 8 The plurality declared that, on the contrary,
the Chambers decision was fact-specific and did not establish a constitutional precedent."9 The Court further challenged the Montana
Supreme Court's reliance on Crane v. Kentucky"5 to declare that
(1977)).
1S

See id. at 2019-20. The majority pointed to the 10 states, including Montana,

that have precluded juries from considering evidence of a defendant's intoxication
in determining the existence of the requisite mens rea. See id. at 2020 n.2.
11 See id. at 2020 (citing THIRD SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRE.
ON
ALCOHOL AND HEALTH FROM THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 64

(1978); Note, AlcoholAbuse and theLaw, 94HARV. L. REv. 1660, 1681-1682 (1981)).
1 See id. The plurality also held that Montana's rule "comports with and implements society's moral perception that one who has voluntarily impaired his own
faculties should be responsible for the consequences." Id.
n6 See id. at 2021. The rule allowing ajury to consider a defendant's voluntary
intoxication as it pertains to mens rea "is of too recent a vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent allegiance to qualify as fundamental,
especially since it displaces a lengthy common-law tradition which remains supported by valid justifications today." Id.
1
410 U.S. 284 (1973).
119 See Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022; see also Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294. In Chambers,
defendant Leon Chambers was on trial for murder. See id. at 291. At trial, he was
prevented from introducing evidence on hearsay grounds and was precluded from
cross-examining his own witness who had confessed to the murder. See id.; see also
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (declaring that the right of the accused to present witnesses in his own defense is a "fundamental element of due
process"). The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that "[t]he right of
an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Id.
11 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022. The ChambersCourt declared that "[iun reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law." Chambers,
410 U.S. at 302. Neither, the Court expressed, "does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and
implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures." Id. at 302-03.
120 476 U.S. 688 (1986).
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Egelhoff s due process rights had been violated.12' The Court submitted that Crane supported the principle that relevant evidence
could be excluded as long as there existed a valid state justification
for the exclusion.In
The Court next examined the Montana Supreme Court's analysis and attempt to compare In re Winship2 3 and Sandstrom v. Montana2 to the present case.Iu Justice Scalia declared that those decisions were not applicable because even the Montana Supreme Court
had recognized that in the case at bar the burden of proof had not
been shifted.'2 The plurality observed that the Montana Supreme
Court characterized section 45-2-203 as a burden-reducing, rather
than a burden-shifting, statute.'2 The Court noted that this statute
made it easier for the state to prove the existence of a culpable mens
rea beyond a reasonable doubt. 28 The plurality asserted that the
Due Process Clause does not prohibit states from enacting "changes
in their criminal laws that have the effect of making it easier for the

121

See Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022. In Crane, the Court held that "an essential

component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard," an opportunity
that would be effectively denied "if the State were permitted to exclude competent,
reliable evidence... when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence." Crane, 476 U.S. at 690.
i See Egethoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022. In this regard, the CraneCourt maintained that
"[iun the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case
encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.'" Crane,476
U.S. at 690-91 (citations omitted). Thus, due process principles are not violated
when for a valid reason a state limits the introduction of otherwise relevant evidence. See id.
123 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
124 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
See Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. at 2022. In Winship, the Court declared that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every element of the charged crime in order to gain a conviction. See 397
U.S. at 364; see also supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing Winship).
The Court in Sandstrom held that ajury instruction that shifts to the defendant the
burden of proof on a requisite element of mental state violates due process. See 442
U.S. at 524; see also supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing Sandstrom).
12 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d
260, 266
(Mont. 1995)). The Court noted that the jury was still instructed that Egelhoff
could only be found guilty if they found that the state has satisfied each of the prescribed elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. The jury was further instructed that a person commits the crime of deliberate homicide if he purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being. See id.
1
See id. at 2023 (citing Egeihoff,900 P.2d at 266).
I28 See id. According to the Court, such a lessening was not unconstitutional because any excluding evidentiary rule can have the effect of making it easier for the
prosecution to gain a conviction. See id.
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prosecution to gain convictions," unless the change itself is so shocking as to violate a fundamental principle ofjustice.
Justice Scalia concluded by addressing the Montana Supreme
Court's interpretation of Martin v. Ohio," which the Montana court
used to find section 45-2-203 unconstitutional.' 3 ' The plurality discounted this interpretation by claiming that it is the fundamental
right of a defendant to have a jury consider self-defense evidence,
unlike evidence of self-induced intoxication. 13 2 The Court concluded
that the structure of state criminal laws must be left to the province
of the states."'
Id.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n.5 (1986) (declaring
that the Due Process Clause does not bar states from enacting "changes in their
criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain
convictions.").
ISO480 U.S. 228 (1987).
131 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2023. In Martin, the Court upheld
a state law that
placed on the defendant the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 236. In dictum, that Court declared that "[i]t
would be quite different if the jury had been instructed that self-defense evidence
could not be considered in determining whether there was a reasonable doubt
about the State's case .... Such an instruction would relieve the State of its burden
and plainly run afoul of Winship's mandate." Id. at 233-34. Dictum in Martin also
stated that the jury instructions were adequate "to convey to the jury that all of the
evidence, including the evidence going to self-defense, must be considered in deciding whether there was a reasonable doubt about the sufficiency of the State's
proof of the elements of the crime." Id. at 234.
The Montana Supreme Court attempted to analogize Martin to the present case
by declaring that Egelhoff, while permitted to present evidence of his intoxication,
was not permitted to instruct the jury to consider whether the existence of such intoxication prevented him from forming the requisite mental state necessary to
commit deliberate homicide. See Egeihoff, 900 P.2d at 265. The court denounced
this inconsistency as a violation of his due process rights. See id.
The Montana court opined that because the jury was not allowed to consider
evidence of Egelhoff's intoxication, the state was impermissibly relieved of part of
its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of every necessary element of deliberate homicide. See id. at 266. The court also argued that because the
jury was instructed that they could not consider Egelhoffs intoxication for purposes
of determining a mental state of "knowingly" or "purposely," they might have been
misled into believing that the state had already proved the mental state beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id.; see also supra note 103 (discussing state and federal evidentiary rules that exclude evidence that may mislead the jury).
1
See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2023. At stake in Martinwas the right of a defendant
to have ajury consider evidence of self-defense; by contrast, Egelhoff claimed that
he had a constitutional right to have the jury consider evidence of his self-induced
intoxication. See id.
Justice Scalia also criticized the comparison to Martin by asserting that dicta is
not legally binding: "'It is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that
we must attend.'" Id. (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1673,
12

1676 (1994)).
I

See id. at 2023-24. TheJustice reminded:
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Justice Ginsburg authored a concurrence and argued that section 45-2-203 is not merely an evidentiary proscription but rather a
redefinition of the criminal law.'3 The Justice determined this by
observing that section 45-2-203 does not appear in, the portion of
Montana's Code that deals with evidentiary rules."" The concurrence declared that Montana had effected a redefinition of the terms
"purposely" and "knowingly," thereby removing "the entire subject of
voluntary intoxication from the mens rea inquiry.""" Therefore, Justice Ginsburg stated, in a prosecution for deliberate homicide, the
state need not prove that a defendant "purposely or knowingly
caused the death of another ... in a completely subjective sense. " '
The concurrence noted that state legislatures have a great deal of
latitude in defining state crimes." Justice Ginsburg opined that section 45-2-203 does not lessen the burden of the prosecution to prove
every element beyond a reasonable doubt since the relevancy of the

"The doctrines of actus reus [and] mens tea... have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This
process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of
the States."
Id. at 2023-24 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
"4 See id. at 2024 (GinsburgJ.,
concurring).
135
See id. Instead, it appears in tide 45, the section dealing with crimes, in a
chapter entitled "General Principles of Liability." See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2
(1995).
136 Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In doing
so, Justice
Ginsburg continued, Montana had rendered evidence of a defendant's intoxication
logically irrelevant to proof of the requisite mental state. See id.
During oral argument, an interesting exchange occurred when the Justices
questioned the Attorney General of Montana and the United States Solicitor General on how states could legitimately exclude evidence (such as intoxication) that
may be logically relevant to whether or not a defendant committed the crime in
question. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7-9, Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct.
2013 (1996) (No. 95-566). At one pointJustice Scalia even declared: "The man is
so drunk he thinks he's shooting an [sic] pink elephant, and he's shooting a human being." Id. at 9. The Justice exclaimed, "[n]ow... surely that's logically relevant." Id. The Attorney General of Montana responded to Justice Scalia's remark
by asserting that although a defendant's intoxication may be logically relevant, states
may exercise their prerogative in terming such evidence legally irrelevant as a matter
of public policy. See id.
7 Egethoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-2-101 (34)-(63) (1995) (defining the terms "knowingly" and "purposely"
under Montana law).
"3 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024-25 (GinsburgJ.,
concurring).

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

534

[Vol. 28:514

standard depends on how a state defines the elements of the offense
charged.'"
Next, Justice Ginsburg reiterated that a state has wide latitude to
define the elements of a crime.'4 The Justice declared that due
process protection is only warranted when a state's criminal law offends a fundamental principle ofjustice.14 ' The concurrence opined
that such a principle ofjustice is not offended by eliminating the exculpatory value of voluntary intoxication because the exclusion is
consistent with the common law and a significant minority of
states. 42 The Justice then pointed to the growing number of states
that have upheld statutes similar to section 45-2-203, not merely as an
evidentiary rule, but as a redefinition of the mental state element.' 4'
Justice Ginsburg concluded by noting that both a sober person and a
voluntarily intoxicated person may be held equally responsible for
their actions. Therefore, the Montana law violates no constitutional
provision.'"
Justice O'Connor authored a dissenting opinion and was joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. '" The dissent observed that
the Due Process Clause establishes an outer boundary on the restrictions that may be placed on a defendant's right to defend against
charges brought by the state.'" The dissent declared that it is unconstitutional to exclude an entire category of evidence so relevant to
the defendant's state of mind because it impermissibly reduces the
state's burden of proof.' 47 Justice O'Connor next addressed the plurality's assertion that many evidentiary rules proscribe certain forms
See id. (citing Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S. 197, 211 n.12 (1977)).
See id. The Justice observed that "[c]omprehended as a measure redefining
mens rea, section 45-2-203 encounters no constitutional shoal." Id. at 2024
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). The justice noted that states may define what will constitute criminal behavior, "particularly when determining 'the extent to which moral
culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime.'" Id. at 2025
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968)
(BlackJ, concurring)).
1
See id. at 2025 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
'4 See id.
143 See id; see also State v. Ramos, 648 P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz.
1982) (conceding that
"[p]erhaps the state of mind which needs to be proven here is a watered down
mens rea; however, this is the prerogative of the legislature."); State v. Souza, 813
P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991) (holding that "[tihe legislature was entitled to redefine the mens rea element of crimes and to exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate state of mind.").
4
See Egehoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
45 See id. at 2026 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
146 See d.
147 See id.
39
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of relevant evidence.'" The dissent asserted that, unlike other evidentiary proscriptions, Montana's "statute places a blanket exclusion
on a category of evidence" that a defendant
can use to disprove the
4
9
existence of a culpable mental state.
The dissent then explained how the Due Process Clause prevents states from excluding evidence where such an exclusion would
be tantamount to infringing on a defendant's right to present a defense.' o° The dissent reasoned that because Montana's deliberate
homicide statute requires a mental state of "purposely" or
"knowingly," the prosecution must prove the existence of such a
mental state in order to convict. 5' Justice O'Connor noted that the
Montana statute prohibits a category of defendants from disputing
their guilt by excluding evidence relevant to whether they acted with
The dissent observed that the Montana
purpose or knowledge.
Supreme Court has held evidence of voluntary intoxication to be
relevant in a determination of a mental state.'"
The dissent next examined the historical viewpoint surrounding
the consideration of voluntary intoxication.'" The Justice declared
that the growing admissibility of evidence of intoxication is consistent with the common-law rule that intoxication does not justify the

' See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) (discussing a state's ability
leally to exclude certain forms of logically relevant evidence).
Ege/hoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Such an exclusion, in
the view of Justice O'Connor, frees the prosecution from having to prove the existence of the requisite mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Justice
O'Connor also differentiated this evidentiary proscription from other constitutionally permitted ones by stating that the sole purpose of section 45-2-203 was to alleviate the state's burden of proof, whereas other evidentiary rules serve to vindicate
some societal value such as encouraging the confidential nature within the communication of certain relationships. See id. at 2029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The
Justice asserted that while due process does not prevent a state from effecting certain changes in the criminal law that may benefit the prosecution, section 45-2-203
fails to pass constitutional muster because its sole pupose is to make it easier for the
state to gain a conviction. See id.
1W See id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent discussed how both
Chambers and Crane had been misinterpreted by the plurality as not applying to the
case at bar. See id. at 2026-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151 See id. at 2028 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor noted that when
such evidence is introduced, the prosecution must work harder to overcome whatever doubts the defense has raised. See id.
152 See id. at 2029 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
I" See id.
15 See id. at 2029-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted
that
"[firom 1551 until its shift in the 19th century, the common-law rule prevailed that
a defendant could not use intoxication as an excuse or justification for an offense,
or, it must be assumed, to rebut establishment of a requisite mental state." Id.
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commission of a crime. " The Justice explained, however, that intoxication has generally been considered relevant to the existence of
an element of a crime-the requisite mental state."
Concluding, Justice O'Connor addressed the position of the
concurrence that the 1987 amendment to section 45-2-203 constituted a change in the state's definitions of "purposely" and
"knowingly." 57 The Justice acknowledged that states may redefine
the elements of various crimes, but argued that there is no evidence
that such a redefinition occurred in Montana.'58 The dissent posited
that deference should be given to the state supreme court when determining whether that state has redefined its criminal law.1 59
Justice Souter also dissented and argued that Montana had neither redefined its criminal law nor justified its exclusion of relevant
exculpatory evidence."8 The Justice declared that a due process
analysis of Montana's statute must comport not only with traditional
notions of ordered liberty,'' but also with contemporary standards of
fairness. 6 2 Justice Souter suggested several ways that Montana could
have constitutionally effectuated its desire to prevent defendants
from using evidence of their intoxication to negate mens rea." '
First, the Justice suggested, Montana could have defined a culpable
mental state in such a way as to give voluntary intoxication no exculpatory relevance. The Justice noted that this option would have reSee Egelhoff, 116 S. CL at 2030 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
See id. Thejustice instructed:
"Drunkenness is no excuse for crime; yet, in that class of crimes and
offenses which depend upon guilty knowledge, or the coolness and
deliberation with which they shall have been perpetrated, to constitute
their commission... [drunkenness] should be submitted to the consideration of the Jury"; for, where the crime required a particular
mental state, "it is proper to show any state or condition of the person
that is adverse to the proper exercise of the mind" in order "[tlo rebut" the mental state.
Id. (quoting Pigman v. Staie, 14 Ohio 555, 556-57 (1846)).
157 See id.
158 See id. at 2031 (0' Connor,J., dissenting).

See id. (citing HortonvilleJoint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426
U.S. 482, 488 (1976)). Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court held that evidence of
voluntary intoxication was relevant to the existence of the requisite mental state. See
id. (citing State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 265 (Mont. 1995)).
160 See id. at 2032 (SouterJ.,
dissenting).
161 See Egehoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2082 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
59

162

Se id.

See id. at 2033 (SouterJ., dissenting).
See id. The Justice maintained that while Winship stipulated that the Due
Process Clause requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
163
1
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defined Montana's definition of "knowingly" and "purposely" to exclude specifically any intoxication evidence."' Justice Souter next
declared that Montana could have justified section 45-2-203 by claiming that it would be irrational for a state to allow a defendant to introduce intoxication to question his mental state, but not to offer
such evidence to suggest that he was incapacitated.'"
The Justice
concluded by submitting that the Montana Legislature had attempted to cut "the conceptual corner" by leaving untouched the
definitions of culpable mental
states while excluding evidence rele1 7
vant to proving such a state.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, filed a succinct dissent
and stated that not only had Montana not redefined the mental
state, but that section 45-2-203 would be problematic even if such a
redefinition had occurred.'" The Justice also reasoned that "[i]f the
legislature wanted to equate voluntary intoxication [with] knowledge, and purpose" it could have plainly stated so.1"9
Egelhoff is troubling in several respects. To begin with, the plurality failed to balance adequately the interests of the state against
Egelhoff s due process rights as required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the decision of the Court may be consistent with
antiquated notions of the evil of intoxication, it ignores a wellestablished principle that liability and punishment should be imposed in proportion to actual culpability.
element of the crime charged, the states have wide latitude to determine what those
elements will be. See id; see also supra note 136 (discussing the belief of the concurrence that Montana had effected a redefinition in its criminal law).
SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2033 (Souter, J., dissenting).
&666 See id. at 2034 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
167 See id.
168 See id. at 2034-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Such a redefinition, argued Justice
Breyer, would encounter constitutional problems of determining guilt not upon a
state of mind but upon "irrelevant external circumstances." See id. at 2035 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer offered the following hypothetical to point out a logical challenge to section 45-2-203:
An intoxicated driver stopped at an intersection who unknowingly accelerated into a pedestrian would likely be found guilty, for ajury unaware of [his] intoxication would likely infer knowledge or purpose.
An identically intoxicated driver racing along a highway who unknowingly sideswiped another car would likely be found innocent, for ajury
unaware of [his] intoxication would likely infer negligence. Why
would a legislature want to write a statute that draws such a distinction,
upon which a sentence of life imprisonment, or death, may turn?
Id.
169 Id. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, however, refrained from
addressing the constitutionality of such a hypothetical statute. See id.
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In trying James Allen Egelhoff, the State contended that he
knew that his actions would cause the death of another and that he
intended that they do so. The Montana Supreme Court correctly
found that it is fundamentally unfair to allow a state to submit evidence in support of such a conclusion, without permitting a jury to
consider evidence that cast doubt upon it. 70 Further, there is no
evidence to support the notion, as the concurrence suggests, that
Montana had effected a change in its substantive criminal laws, specifically in redefining the terms "knowingly" and "purposely" to exclude the impact of voluntary intoxication. Indeed, the Montana
Supreme Court seemed to reject such a suggestion.
Montana claimed that its primary justification for section 45-2203 was to preclude those who become drunk from using their intoxication as a defense. As the dissent discussed, however, the State
of Montana had available several other less constitutionally objectionable options.12 For example, Montana could have enacted a law
specifically applicable to murders committed while intoxicated. An
even more tenable solution for Montana would have been to follow
the lead of NewJersey, which requires a showing of great prostration
of the faculties such that the requisite mental state is totally lacking. 17 The application of such a standard to the case at bar, while
See State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 266 (Mont. 1995).
See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992) (stating that "[iut would be
a
strange rule of federalism that ignores the view of the high court of a State as to the
meaning of its own law.").
The concurrence is also troubling because Justice Ginsburg appears to maintain that states have a great deal of latitude in establishing their criminal laws, which
effect due process concerns. See Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024-25 (Ginsburg,J., concurring); see also supra notes 138, 140 and accompanying text (detailing Justice Ginsburg's belief that the makeup of criminal laws are within the proper province of the
states). This seems to be in direct contrast with the Justice's dissent in Sandin v.
Connor. See 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). In SandinJustice Ginsburg maintained that liberty interests derived from due process, "that may
vary from Ossining, New York, to San Quentin, California, [do] not resemble the
'Liberty' enshrined among 'unalienable Rights' with which all persons are endowed
'by their Creator.'" Id. at 2303 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (quoting THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)). Surely in the same vein, one would think
thatJustice Ginsburg would not support a due process clause that is less protective
in Montana than it is in NewJersey.
72 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2033 (SouterJ., dissenting).
17s See State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 54, 514 A.2d 1302, 1308-09 (1986)
170
1

(declaring that "[iun order to satisfy the statutory condition that to qualify as a defense intoxication must negative an element of the offense, the intoxication must
be of an extremely high level."); see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8 (West 1997)
(stating that "intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.").
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not guaranteeing that Egeihoff would have been acquitted since his
blood alcohol concentration was .36, would have satisfied 7Egelhoff's
due process right to have ajury consider such a possibility. 4
Egelhoff is also troubling because Montana allows evidence of involuntary intoxication to be considered by juries. "
Intoxication
should be viewed not by the method through which it is achieved,
but by the effects it may have on the mental states of those who experience it. This is why the great majority of our states allow voluntary intoxication to negate "specific intent" crimes.
In Sandstrom v. Montana,76 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional ajury instruction stating that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."' "7 The
defendant in Sandstrom was charged with the same offense as James
Allen Egelhoff under the very same Montana statute. With Egelhoff
the United States Supreme Court has resurrected that once seemingly prohibited instruction, amending it slightly to read: The law
presumes that a voluntarily intoxicated man intends the ordinary consequences of his acts. Such a pronunciation by the Supreme Court,
no matter how rationalized or morally persuasive, is a drastic divergence from the Court's decisions stemming from Winship and its
progeny.
HowardJ.Brookman

See Brief of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities and the New
York Chapter of Parents of Murdered Children as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 26, Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (No. 95-566). In their
brief, the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities and the New York
Chapter of Parents of Murdered Children argued that while a blood alcohol concentration of .36 may be extremely high, many people may have a greater tolerance
of alcohol so that their state of mind is not impaired by their legal intoxication. See
id.
174

75 See MONT. CODE ANN.
176 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
177

Id. at 513.

§ 45-2-203 (1995).

